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In this paper we examine the estimation of a structural job search
model using data on individual unemployment durations. The model allows
for transitions from unemployment to nonparticipation. In an extended
version of the model we deal with the influence of on-the-job search and
prospective wage increases on search behaviour of the unemployed.
In empirical studies on unemployment duration the reduced-form
appraoch, in which only hazards of the duration distribution are estimated
(see e.g. Lancaster (1979)) seems to be replaced gradually by a structural
approach. The latter way of modeling is characterized by the explicit use
of the framework of job search theory in empirical analysis. The results
from such analyses can be used for inferences about the behaviour of the
unemployed. In particular a distinction can be made between choice and
chance components of the transition rate into employment.
Up to now a small number of empirical studies using structural
search models have been published (Yoon (1981), Lancaster 8~ Chesher
(1983), Lynch (~983), Narendranathan 8~ Nickell (1985), Ridder 8~ Gorter
(1986), Wolpin (1987)) some of which use a very restricted model specifi-
cation (notably the first three references). None of the papers referred
to uses a model that allows for transitions from unemployment to nonparti-
cipation. In reality an individual who is unemployed and actively search-
ing for a job may drop out of the labour force, at some point of time
during unemployment. It may be that the papers referred to do not take
accounts of transitions into nonparticipation because the data used are
not rich enough to make the distinction between the states of unemployment
and nonparticipation. This can be the case if the data collection is based
on the receipt of unemployment benefits. Another cause for not taking
account of such transitions may be that in the time those data were col-
lected (typically the seventies) the occurrence of such transitions was
less prominent. However, by now there is much evidende that a large por-
tion of the flow out of unemployment consists of transitions into nonpar-
ticipation (for a survey of the literature, see Micklewright (1988) who
also forecefully argues that the state of nonparticipation should be in-
corporated in duration models of the labour market, especially if one is
interested in the effects of benefits on unemployment duration). In the3
sample we use, almost 30;G of all spells of unemployment ends up in a tran-
sition into nonparticipation. Therefore we estimate a structural job
search model that allows for such transitions.
Further, up to now the structural models used in empirical ana-
lyses do not take into account that wage increases during employment may
be expected. Wages can increase for several reasons such as accumulation
of human capital or transitions from jobs with lower wages to jobs with
t~igher wages without intervening spells of unemployment (on the job
search, see e.g. Mortensen (1986)). The optimal strategy of an unemployed
individual is likely to be dependent on changes of wages and jobs that
occur after the acceptance of a job. We estimate an extended version of
the model, which deals with these aspects.
In section 2 we discuss the specification of the basic search
model. We outline how the model may be given an alternative interpretation
which is more realistic with regards to the process of search. This in-
terpretation allows for knowledge of the wage rate associated with a va-
cancy before one responds to that vacancy, i.e. before the job is actually
offered. Section 3 contains a description of the data, and a discussion of
the empirical implementation of the model. Section 4 deals with the esti-
mation of the wage offer distribution. Section 5 gives the main results.
We present estimates of the job offer arrival rate, the transition rate
into nonparticipation, and the utility function. For distinct age catego-
ries and levels of education we present sample averages of the main cha-
racteristics of the job search process. From a policy viewpoint it may be
of interest to see whether a decrease in unemployment benefits has any
influence on duration. If not, this may lead to a re-evaluation of bene-
fits as a policy tool. Therefore we give special attention to the effects
of changes in benefits on the reservation wage and the expected duration.
White's Information Matrix test is used in order to check whether unob-
served heterogeneity is present in the structural parameters.
In section 6 the construction of the extended model is described
and the results of the estimation of the extended model are discussed.
Section ~ concludes.4
2. The model
2.1. Job search theory and model specificatton
Job search theory describes the behaviour of unemployed indivi-
duals who are searching sequentially for jobs until a suitable one has
been found (for surveys, see Mortensen (1986) or McKenna (1985)). Job
offers arrive randomly in time at the arrival rate ~. Such job offers are
random drawings (without recall) from a wage offer distribution F(w).
During unemployment a benefit b is received. The variables ~, b en w are
measured per unit time period. Unemployed individuals aim at maximization
of their expected discounted lifetime utility (over an infinite horizon).
For now we also assume that once a job is accepted it will be held forever
at the same wage.
The per-period utility function is a separable function of two
arguments, income and state:
utility ( income - x, state - employment)




The function u is increasing in its argument and may take account of risk
~
aversion. We normalize by setting v- 1. Somewhat loosely we call v the
disutility of unemployment.
In the sequel only stationary job search models are considered.
Thís means that we take a, b, u, v and F(w) to be independent of unemploy-
ment duration and calender time and independent of all events during un-
employment. Obviously this is not very realistic. The level of unemploy-
ment benefits depends generally on the elapsed duration of unemployment.
The job offer arrival rate may decrease during unemployment as a result of
the stigma that the long-term unemployed may have. Further, a, b and F(w)
may change due to business cycle effects. The motivation for adopting the
stationarity assumption is basically the same as it was in the other empi-
rical studies using structural search models (see e.g. Lancaster 8~ Chesher
(1983) and Narendranathan ~ Níckell (1985)). That is, when estimating a
nonstationary model the computational difficulties are likely to be even5
more burdensome, so ít seems a good strategy to start off with a stationa-
ry model. (For an analysis of nonstationarity in job search theory, see
van den Berg (1987)) In section 4 we return to the effects that the pre-
sence of nonstationarity might have on the estimation results.
The optimal strategy of an unemployed individual in the model
sketched above can be characterized by a fixed reservation wage 9~. A job
offer is accepted if its wage exceeds ~o while a wage that is smaller than
S~ induces one to reject the offer and search for a better one. The transi-
tion rate from unemployment into employment 8 can be written as the pro-
duct of the job offer arrival rate and the conditional probability of
accepting a job offer.
(2.1) 9 - ~F(y) F - 1-F
In reality an individual who is unemployed and actively searching
for a job may drop out of the labour force, at some point of time during
unemployment. This may be the result of a personal decision of that indi-
vidual e.g. if he decides to dedicate all his time to household activi-
ties. It can also be a forced transition, e.g. when he is conscrípted or
when he becomes disabled or when he retires. All these cases can be la-
beled as transitions out of unemployment into nonparticipation.
Flinn 8~ Heckman (1982) present a three-state structural search
model which could serve as a starting point for our model. In this three-
state model the distribution of returns of nonparticipants enters the
equations tha~ describe the behaviour of the unemployed. This implies that
data on returns of nonparticipants are needed in order to estimate the
model. Such data are not available. Therefore we adopt a reduced-form
modeling of the transitions from unemployment into nonparticipation. Spe-
cifically, such transitions are assumed to occur according to a Poisson
process with a parametrized transition rate ~.
The optimal strategy of an unemployed individual depends on the
expected utility of becoming a nonparticipant. If the latter is high with
respect to the expected utility of becoming employed then it is optimal to
accept a job offer only if the wage corresponding to it is very high. Let
x denote the flow of income of a nonparticipant. We make the assumption6
(2.2) Eu(x) - u(b)
For a lot of cases the income flow after becoming a nonparticipant is
close to the benefit level (e.g. when an unemployed individual becomes
disabled, when he retires, when he is conscripted, when he returns to
school and applies for social assistance). If the dispersion of the dis-
tribution of x is small, which we expect to be the case, then Ex ~ b im-
plies that Eu(x) m u(b). To sum up, we do not assume anything about the
distribution of the income flow x in the state of nonparticipation except
that equation (2.2) holds. In addition, we assume that the state of non-
participation is absorbing and, for the moment, we assume that the non-
pecuniary component of per-period utility in nonparticipation is the same
as that in unemployment. As an additional condition for stationarity to
hold we require that ~ is constant (though possibly different across indi-
viduals). Again this may not be very realistic. Individuals may enter
nonparticipation at an increasing rate when they become discouraged about
their chances on the labour market. This in turn may happen more frequent-
ly among the long-term unemployed.
In appendix 1 we prove that the reservation wage ~ which characte-
rizes the optimal strategy in the model satisfies the following equation
a
m
(2.3) u(f~) - v.u(b) t P} ~, f(u(w)-u(F~) )dF(w)
~
The exit rate out of unemployment is equal to the sum of 8 and ;, with 8
given by equation (2.1). Because 8 and ; do not depend on duration or on
time or on events during unemployment this implies that the unemployment
duration has an exponential distribution with parameter 8 4~.
2.2. An alternattve interpretation
It can be argued that the modeling of the search process so far is
not very realistic. Generally one knows the wage rate associated with a
vacancy before one responds to that vacancy, i.e. before the job is ac-
tually offered. Narendranathan 8~ Nickell (1985) constructued a search
model that deals with this. Job vacancies arrive according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate ql. A vacancy is characterized by a randomdrawing from a distribution of wages associated with the flow of vacan-
cies, G(w). The decision whether to apply or not is made with knowledge of
the wage corresponding to the vacancy. If one does apply, then there is a
(known) probability of q2(w) that the job will actually be offered. The
dependence of q2 on w represents increased competition for vacancies with
higher wages.
It is straightforward to show that the model developed in subsec-
tion 2.1 is equivalent to the model described here. To see this, equate




(2.5) F(w) - 0
fmq2(W)dG(~)
0
Consequently, the estimation results of the original model can be rein-
terpreted according to equations ( 2.4) and ( 2.5). Narendranathan ~, Nickell
(1985) make the convenient assumption that
(2.6) q2(w) - 93(w).94
in which q3 depends on w only, while q4 represents the dependence of q2 on
personal characteristics. If (2.6) holds then F(w) in (2.5) does not de-
pend on q4, i.e. does not depend on personal characteristics which in-
fluence the probabílity that the job is offered given application.
3. The data
3.1. The data set
The data set used is constructed from the Netherlands Socio-Econo-
mic Panel, a survey conducted by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statis-
tics. As of April 1984 a random sample of about 12000 individuals is being
interviewed twice a year (in April and October). At every interview except
the first one, c~espondents are asked to recall their labour market history8
for the past 6 months. At the first interview this period is extended to
12 months. Given present information we have labour market histories for
2.5 years, from May 1983 up to October 1985.
For our purposes we selected 223 men aged between 17 and 65, who
reported that at the moment of the first interview (April 1984) their main
activity was being unemployed and searching for work. We determined for
how long they were unemployed and searching for work at that moment, and
(using subsequent waves) also for how long they would remain unemployed
and searching for work after that moment. By analogy of the renewal theory
literature we call these durations the backward and forward recurrence
times, respectively. For 40 individuals we could not construct the forward
recurrence time because they were not interviewed in subsequent waves.
These are mainly young people leaving their parents' home. Note that thís
might create a selection problem since these people might leave because
they found a job elsewhere. We return to this issue in section 5.
Of the backward and forward recurrence times, 64x and 39X are
censored in the sense that it is only known that the realized time exceeds
a certain value. Part of the 39;G is due to respondents who drop out of the
panel before October 1985. Of all 112 uncensored forward recurrence times
71x ended in a transition into employment. The other 29X became nonparti-
cipants. This means that according to their own perception they were not
unemployed and searching for a job anymore though they weren't employed
either. The state of nonparticipation covers a wide range of activities
like being conscripted, being disabled, being retired, doing unpaid work
in the household, being in full-time training and just doing nothing. The
limited amount of observations in the sample prohibits a subdivision of
the state of nonparticipation into different states. Note that in some
cases nonparticipants can receive unemployment insurance benefits.
By taking a closer look at the uncensored forward durations we
observe a phenomenon that appears strange at first sight. Of the 112 un-
censored forward recurrence times 54x seem to have ended at the day of an
interview. That is, at wave n(n - 1,2,3) the individual reports that he
is unemployed whereas at wave ntl he reports that as of the date of the
previous interview he has been in a different state. Clearly these people
over-estimate the elapsed duration of the activities that they perform9
after leaving the state of unemployment. We have to account for these
"memory problems" when deriving the likelihood.
The data set provides a range of personal characteristics. We used
the characteristics as reported in April 1984. Since we do not know the
level of benefits that individuals obtained during spells of unemployment
that started and finished between two successive waves of the panel, we
decided to consider only those spells that contained the date of the first
interview.
3.2. Likelihood function
In our stationary model the backward and forward recurrence time
and the state of destination given exit from unemployment are stochasti-
cally independent (see e.g. Ridder (1984)). Because of this independence
the individual log-likelihood contribution is simply the sum of three
parts. The state of destination given exit from unemployment has a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter 8~(8t~). The forward recurrence time
has an exponential distribution with parameter 9 t~. By assuming that the
individual entry rate into unemployment is constant before the moment of
the first interview, the backward recurrence time follows this distribu-
tion as well. The forward and backward recurrence times are denoted as T
and t, respectively. The state of destination is denoted as e with E- 1
if the state is employment and E- 0 if the state is nonparticipation. The
occurrence of censoring and the occurrence of the so-called memory pro-
blems are tal~en to be exogenous. If T is missing then this is taken to be
exogenous as well.
First consider the state of destination. Let cl - 1 if T is cen-
sored and cl - 0 otherwise. Let c2 - 1 if T is missing and c2 - 0 other-
wise. The part of the individual log-likelihood contribution L due to the
state of destination is L1,
(3.1) L1 - (1-c2)(1-cl)(E log 8t(1-e)log ~-log(8t~))
So if K is censored or missing then e is not observed and consequently
L1 - 0.10
Next consider the backward recurrence time. Let c3 - 1 if t is
censored and c3 - 0 otherwise. The part of L due to t is L2,
(3-2) L2 - Í 1-c3).log(8~b) - t.(8t~)
If no memory problems are present then the part of L due to T can
be obtained by replacing in equation (3.2) i- c3 by (1-cl)(1-c2) and t by
(1-c2).T. Recall that memory problems are present if the data suggest that
the spell of unemployment ended on the day at which the individual was
being interviewed for the first, second or third time. For such indivi-
duals it can only be inferred that the spell ended somewhere between two
subsequent interviews, say the n-th and the (n.l)st (n - 1,2 or 3). By
assumption it is ruled out that transitions can be forgotten. One is in-
clined to think that when the spell of unemployment ends some weeks before
the (n}1)st interview that date of the transition will be reported more
accurately than when the spell ends some weeks after the n-th interview.
This is confirmed by the fact that most reported transitions between two
subsequent interviews took place less than three months before the latest
of both interviews. Therefore, if s memory problem is present in the sense
that a spell seems to have ended at the date of the first, second or third
interview, than this is interpreted as evidence that the spell has ended
between that date and three months later. Later on it will be examíned
whether the results are sensitive with respect to the assumption that
memory problems can only occur if the transition takes place in the three
month period after each interview. Let T1 denote the length of this three
month period. Let c4 - 1 if a memory problem is present and c4 - 0 other-
wise. The part of L due to i is L3,
L3 - (1-c2)C(1-cl).{(1-c4)(1og(9t~)-T.(St~))
-(g{3)T -(g}~)(TtT )
t c4.(log(e -e 1 ))}
(3.3) ~ cl.{-T(8.~)}]
- (1-c2)~-T(843) ; (1-cl)(1-c4)lo8(g;T)11
-(8t~).~1
t (1-cl).c~.log(1-e )]
It is likely that similar to the occurrence of inemory problems in
the reported values of t there may be problems in the reported values of
t. In the sample almost no transitions into unemployment are reported for
the first three months after April 1983. We assume that whenever a transi-
tion into unemployment occurred before July 1983, individuals with a memo-
ry problem report at the date of the first interview that they have been
unemployed for more than a year. Consequently in case the reported cen-
sored t equals one year then this is interpreted as evidence that t ex-
ceeds nine months. Let tl denote the length of that nine month period.
Equation (3.2) has to be modified to
(3.4) L2 - (1-c3)(log(st~) - t.(~t~)) - c3.t1.(gf~)
The log-likelihood contribution L of an individual with known cl, c2, c3,
c4, t, T and E is given by the sum of the right-hand sides of equations
(3.1). (3.3) and (3.4). The structural parameters and functions of the job
search model (u,v,p,a,F(w)) enter the likelihood via 8(see equations
(2.1) and (2.3)). The parameter j enters L both directly and indirectly
via 9.
3.3. The empirícal tmplementation
Now that we have specified the structural model and described the
data we examine ín this subsection the functional forms of the exogenous
variables and discuss parametrizations. As for the wage offer distribution
however this will be done in section 4 because that section is devoted
entirely to the estimation of F(w).
The job offer arrival rate ~ and the transition rate into nonpar-
ticipation ; are written as exponential functions of observable exogenous
variables x and z, respectively,
~ - exp(x'p),
~ - exP(z'X)12
The vector x includes variables which are of interest to employers e.g.
because they give an indication of the productivity of the job searcher.
Examples are level of education (we distinguish between five levels), age,
nationality, whether the individual has had a job before (this was being
asked explicitly) and whether he is married. We include the local unem-
ployment percentage as a(crude) indicator of labour market tightness. The
vector x also includes a variable that depends on the number of working
individuals in the household. If this number is high then the unemployed
individual may have easier access to employers.
The vector z consísts of variables which are important for the
process of transiting into nonparticipation, either by chance or by choi-
ce. Obviously, age is important because young individuals may get drafted
into the armed forces and older individuals retire or get disabled more
often than younger ones. Furthermore. young unemployed individuals often
return to school for additional training especially if they did not have
any job before.
Similarly to Narendranathan ~ Nickell (1985) and Ridder ~ Gorter
(1986) the utility function of income u is taken to be logarithmic. The
subjective rate of discount p is fixed at lOX per year. In section 5 we
examine the robustness of the results with respect to changes in the func-
tional form of u and with respect to the numerical value of p.
Non-wage income is not included in the model because figures on
personal non-wage income components are not available in the first wave of
the panel survey. A reduced form estimation of 8 with income of other
household members included as a regressor in log 9 showed that this va-
riable has no influence at all on the transition from unemployment into
employment. Therefore it was omitted in the structural model.
The estimation method we have employed was ML using the Newton-
Rapson algorithm. Because of the assumptions that were made on the func-
tional forms of F(w) (see section 4) and u, it follows that equation (2.3)
can be rewritten as an equation that can be solved numerically for ~ with
a high level of precision. Via equation (2.1) the likel.ihood contributions
can then be calculated as a function of the parameters.13
4. The wage offer distribution
4.1. Esttmatton strategy
The most natural way to obtain information on F(w) in a structural
job search model is to use data on post-unemployment wages, for these are
drawings from F(w) truncated at ~(Flinn ~ Heckman (1982)). Combining such
data with duration data makes it possible to estimate F(w) jointly with
the other parameters in the model. However, as we saw in subsection 3.1,
in our sample there are only ~9 transitions from unemployment into employ-
ment. Obviously we want to allow for different F(w) in different segments
of the labour market. For some segments there are not enough post-unem-
ployment wages available in order to be able to estimate F(w). For instan-
ce there are only two individuals with a university degree who provide
such wages. Therefore we take a totally different route in estimating
F(w). We estimate F(w) a priori using data on individuals who were em-
ployed at the date of the first interview. Analogous to Narendranathan ~
Nickell (1985) the a priori estimation results serve to predict individual
wage offer distributions for the unemployed. These predictions are plugged
in when estimating the structural model.
Wages of employed individuals are not random drawings from F(w). A
working individual accepted his present job because its wage exceeded his
reservation wage when he was unemployed. Consequently, observed wages are
drawn from a truncated distribution. However, the point of truncation (the
reservation wage before obtaining the job) is unknown and cannot be esti-
mated because the level of unemployment benefits received before obtaining
the current job, is not available in the data set. In order to deal with
this problem we use an ad hoc reduced-form wage model. The wage w is ob-
served if and only if one is employed. Previous studies (e.g. Kiefer ~
Neumann (1979)) assumed this to be equivalent to w 2 ~, that is, w is
observed if and only if it exceeds the reservation wage príor to employ-
ment. However, this is only true in a díscrete time model in which exactly
one job offer arrives per periód (see Flinn ~ Heckman (1982)) which is a
very strong assumption because it neglects various sources of the dynamics
and uncertainty in the process of search. Therefore we take a latent va-
N
riable y as determining whether one is employed: w is observed if and14
M
only if y) 0. The wage offer distribution F(w) is assumed to be lognor-
mal with pa~ameters x and a2; x- xin with xl observed. The unobserved
variable y is assumed to depend on a linear combination of observed exo-
genous variables x2. This gives the wage model
(4.1) log w - xin t
E1
~
w observed e~ y~ 0
iF M
(4.2) Y - x2~ { e2
2
E1 y N O, 6
612
E2 62
Equation (4.2) can be interpreted as a reduced form description of the way
factors x2 influence the probability of being employed. Obviously every
r
factor that inFluences w, influences y as well. Therefore the variables
in xl are included in the set of variables in x2. We are only interested
in ~, and 62, so the identifying restriction 62 - 1 is harmless.
4.2. Empirical implementatton and results
In order to allow for different values of the parameters of the
wage model in different segments of the labour market the wage model is
estimated separately for each segment. Consider the way such segments can
be defined. For the purpose of predicting wage offer distributions it is
obvious that the explanatory variables appearing in the wage model must be
observed both for employed respondents who provide data on observed wages,
and for unemployed respondents. The same holds for variables defining the
segments. For unemployed individuals there is no information on their
previous job, and new entrants have no previous job at all. Therefore,
segments are defined using data on the level and type of education.
Five levels of educations labelled 1 to 5(from low to high) are distin-
guished. For every level a distinction is made between two types of educa-
tion: technically (including economic) and socially oriented education.
Within segments x is made dependent on age. This is very much the best
that can be done given the limited availability of productivity indicators
that are observed for both unemployed and employed individuals in the data15
set. Also, a more detailed classification into segments results in very
small numbers of wage observations from some segments.
In order to facilitate the estimation of the wage model (in parti-
.
cular equation (4.2)) data on unemployed individuals (y 50) have been used
M
in addition to data on employed individuals (y )0). For reasons of simpli-
city the possibility of transiting into nonparticipation is disregarded in
this section. Analogous to the estimation of the main model attention is
restricted to data on male individuals aged between 1~ and 65. Wages are
net weekly wages.
The wage model has been estimated by ML using the HHHH algorithm,
for every segment. Tests show that in accordance with prior beliefs there
is no difference between the estimates of equation (4.1) for different
types of education given that the level of education equals 2 or 3. For
the lowest level the data set does not provide information on the type of
education. Therefore the technical and social segments were aggregated
when estimating the wage model for the levels 1, 2 and 3. Tests also
show that for the levels 4 and 5 the parameter 62 does not depend on the
type of education, so we imposed this as a restríction. For every segment
the covariance 612 turned out to be insignificantly different from zero at
the lOx level. This means that the events as captured by the latent va-
.
riable y have no significant influence on the wage level. {This is a re-
sult which is frequently encountered in the literature, see e.g. Van
Opstal ~ Theeuwes (1986) and Narendranathan ~ Nickell (1985)) Therefore
equation (4.2) is dropped and F(w) is estimated by OLS on equation (4.1)
using data on employed individuals only.
Table 1 presents the estimation results. Figures 1 and 2 show the
estimated mean wage offers as a function of age. For every segment this is
a concave function. Since we are dealing with cross-sectional data this is
to be interpreted as a cohort effect rather than a life-cycle effect. For
most ages the mean wage offer is increasing in the level of education.
Further the technical type of education has always larger mean wage offers
than the social type has. The variance of log wage offers is increasing
with the level of education. For the segment with level - 5 and type -
social there are only data available on middle-aged employed individuals.
n
The extrapolation of u to low and high ages results in very low values of
N for these ages.16
Table 1. Parameters estimates for the wage offer distribution
level of education estimates
1 ~ - -0.34 t 3.84x - o.46x2
(0.1) (2.7) (2.6)
6 - 0.19, n - 171
2 u --3.37 4 5.10x - 0.68x2
(2.2) (5.9) (5.5)
~ - 0.20, n - 258
3 u --2.50 a 4.57x - 0.59x2
(1.6) (5.1) (4.8)
6 - 0.23, n - 646
4 x --2.59 . b(4.91 t 1.74x - 0.16x2) t
(0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4)
t(1-b).(4.71x - o.61x2)
(1.1) (1.1)
v - 0.26, n - 203
5 u- -29.07 . b(18.48 . 8.76x - 1.i0x2)
t(1-b).(i8.79x - 2.47x2)
(1.6) (1.6)
a - 0.26, n - 85
x - log (age)
n - number of individuals
t-ratios in parentheses
b- 1 if type - technical and ó- 0 otherwise
However, the unemployed individuals in this segment are all middle-aged as
well. Therefore we have confidence that for these individuals the predic-
tion of F(w) is reliable. The wage offer distribution of an unemployed
individual with characteristics x and parameters n and 62 associated with
the segment he can be ascribed to, is predicted as being lognormal with
parameters n'x and 62. The predicted F(w) are plugged in when estimating
the structural model.17
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In terms of the alternative interpretation of subsection 2.2 the
estimation of equation (4.1) does not give estimates of F(w) but instead
it provides estimates of the individual distributions of vacancy wage
offers corrected for wage competition (see equations (2.5) and (2.6)),
w
J 93(W)dG(~)
m w 2 0 (4.3) ~
f q3(~)dG(~)
0
A final thing to note is that for a variety of reasons the current
wage rate of an employed individual may exceed the wage rate that he ob-
tained directly after becoming employed. In section 6 a model that deals
with this issue is considered. Further it is outlined how the wage offer
distribution can be estimated in the presence of such wage differences.
5. Results
5.1. Parameter estímates
The parameter estimates for the structural model described in
subsections 2.1 and 3.3, are presented in table 2. The unit time period is
one week. For the age and education dummies the reference categories are
the age category 46-64 and the level of education 1, respectively. Gene-
rally, the results seem to be in accordance with intuition. Education has
a very significant influence on the job offer arrival rate. An individual
having the highest level of educatian receives offers more than seven
times as frequently as an individual with the lowest level of educstion.
New entrants, having no experience, are offered jobs less often than expe-
rienced individuals. Being married is perceived by employers as a de-
sirable property whereas being a head of a household is not. Single indi-
viduals are also defined as being head of a household, so it may be that
what really matters for employers is not the sheer presence of a partner
but the presence of a family which makes the employee feel responsible.
The importance of the number of working household members may be due to
the fact that such unemployed individuals have easier access to employers.
However, it may also be a consequence of a positive correlation between19
unobserved characLeristics of the unemployed individual and characteris-
tics of other household members, as far as these characteristics are rele-
vant for employers. The local unemployment rate has no significant in-
fluence on ~. Other indicators of the tightness of the labour market like
the local UV ratio performed even worse. Van Opstal ~ Theeuwes (1986) who
estimated a reduced-form duration model using Dutch data from 1984, also
report this lack of significance. Presumably, job search is not restricted
te a region anymore. Another explanation is that numbers on registered
vacancies and unemployed individuals may not be accurate indicators of
labour market tightness. Still, the estimate of -0.04 seems plausible: it
implies that moving from the province with the highest rate of unemploy-
ment (24x) to the one with the lowest (15x) increases ~ with a factor of
almost 1.5. The separate age coefficients in ~ are not significant. How-
ever, a Likelihood Ratio test of the hypothesis that all age coefficients
equal zero leads to a rejection at the lOx level. In section 3 it was
noted that in some cases censoring of the forward recurrence time of young
individuals may arise because they leave their parents' home in order to
start working elsewhere. If so, then the coefficient on the age category
18-23 in the job offer arrival rate is under-estimated.
In terms of the alternative interpretation of the model (see sub-
section 2.2) ~ is the product of the vacancy arrival rate ql and the term
q4 which captures the influence of non-wage variables on the acceptance
probability conditional on application q2. We expect the unemployment
rate, experience in previous jobs, education and age to be linked to q1
while nationality and household characteristics probably are linked to q4.
The signs of the coefficients seem to confirm these prior expectations.
Turning to the rate of transition into nonparticipation, we see
that new entrants leave the labour market more often and that this is also
true for individuals aged below 24 or over 45. The disutility of unemploy-
ment v is smaller than one, implying that contrary to popular statements,
being unemployed is regarded as unpleasant. From the standard error of
0.14 it follows that the hypothesis v- 1 is be rejected by a Wald test at
the 10~ level but not at the 5x level. However, the Likelihood Ratio test
statistic for this hypothesis equals 20.4 ~) xi(0.95) so v- 1 is strongly
rejected.20
Table 2. Parameter estimates for the search model
variable~parameter coefficient (t-ratio)
(i) job offer arrívaZ rate
constant -6.08 (6.4)
Dutch 0.55 (1.3)
education: level 2 0.91 (3.3)
education: level 3 1.1~ (3.6)
education: level 4 1.~4 (2.8)
education: level 5 1,97 (2,g)
age category 18-23 0.68 (1.4)
age category 24-29 0.50 (1.2)
age category 30-45 0.16 (0.4)
new entrant -0,82 (1,5)
head of household -0.03 (0.1)
married 0.~8 (2.5)
log (1 4~ working in household) 1.03 (3.0)
local z unemployment rate -0.04 (1.1)
(ii) rate of transítíon tnto
nonpartícípatíon
constant -4.91 (16.4)
age category 18-23 -0.41 (0.8)
age category 24-29 -1.06 (2.3)
age category 30-45 -1.39 (2.9)
new entrant 0.66 (1.4)
(iii) disutilíty of unemployment
v 0,~4 (5,~)
Log likelihood - -898.2321
5.2. The characterístics of the search process
Civen th~~ p~irtimeter estimntes, the mnin variables of the search
process can be estimated and the influence of changes of the benefit level
on these variables can be evaluated. Table 3 presents sample averages of
the estimates of ~, F(~o) and ; for different age categories and levels of
education. The expected numbers of job offers and transitions into nonpar-
ticipation in a year can be obtained by multiplying the numbers in the a
and ~ row by 52.1. What strikes most is that in most cases F(p) is nearly
equal to one. In particular those who are aged under 24 or over 46, or who
have a primary education only, accept virtually every job that is being
offered. Still, even individuals with a university degree have a probabi-
lity of 0.8 of accepting the first job offered. It means that the reserva-
tion wages are located in the left part of the left tail of the wage offer
distribution. The reason for this is the combination of on the one hand a
very small job offer arrival rate and on the other hand very low values of
the utility function in unemployment (v.u.(b)) relative to employment
(u(w)). Rejection of an offer may well imply a waiting time of more than a
year before the next offer arrives. In the meantime the only source of
income is benefits, which appear to be rather low relative to wages: the
sample average of F(b) equals 0.9. Moreover, because v C 1 there is a
premium on being employed and one is willing to offer money for it by
accepting lower-paid jobs. In fact, in our sample ~9x of the unemployed
even accept jobs with wages below their benefit level, that is, for these
individuals p ~ b.
From table 3 it can be inferred that for groups with a very low
job offer arrival rate, almost 50x of all spells of unemployment end in a
transition into nonparticipation. In other words, without such transitions
the durations of unemployment for such individuals would be approximately
twice as long. See also figures 3 and 4 in which the escape rate out of
unemployment is split in its two parts 8 and ~.
Since the model does not allow for nonstationarity, it may be
interesting to examine in what sense the results are affected by this
omission. It is widely believed that the transition rate into employment 8
is a decreasing function of duration. On the other hand, benefits general-22
ly decrease during unemployment, which ceteris paribus makes 8 an in-
creasing function of duration. One possible explanation for a decreasing 8
is that the job offer arrival rate decreases sharply during unemployment
e.g. as a consequence of a scar effect of being unemployed for a long
time, snd that this decrease of ~ offsets the increase in F(~). If 8 is a
decreasing function of duration then the expected duration of the backward
and forward recurrence times exceeds the expected duration of completed
durations of unemployment and a stock sample of unemployed individuals
contains a relatively large amount of long-term unemployed individuals.
Further, if both a and b decrease during unemployment then ~ also de-
creases. So if nonstationarity is present in reality in the sense that b,
~, ~ and 8 all decrease, then a, ~ and 8 are under-estimated in the sense
that shortly after the inflow into unemployment these variables are larger
than estimated. Another kind of nonstationarity is present if the transi-
tion rate into nonparticipation increases as a function of duration e.g.
as a result of a discouraged worker effect. By analogy of the argument
pointed out above it may be expected that in such a case ; is over-esti-
mated for individuals who are short-term unemployed.
The results so far enable us to investigate a number of questions
related to the effectiveness of policies aimed at a reduction oF unemploy-
ment durations. Table 4 presents for different age categories and levels
of education sample averages of the elasticities of the reservation wage,
the transition rate from unemployment into employment S, and the expected
duration d, with respect to the level of benefits. The results are unambi-
guous: a decrease in the level of benefits has virtually no effect on
durations. Even for unemployed with a university degree a lOX drop in
benefits causes only a lx drop in the expected duration. The individuals
who suffer most from long spells (having primary education only, or aged
under 24 or over 46) are completely insensitive to the benefits policy
instrument. The reasons are clear from table 3. A small decrease in bene-
fits decreases reservation wages, but reservation wages are generally
located in the left part of the left tail of F(w), so F(~) is almost con-
stant on a small interval around ~. In other words the decrease in bene-
fits does not increase the proportion of acceptable jobs substantially.
Consequently, the transition rate from unemployment to employment does not
increase very much. Note that elasticities refer only to infinitesimal23
changes. Still, even a large decrease in the level of benefits does not
have much influence on duration. Individuals accept most jobs already, so
a decrease in ~ forced by a large decrease in b does not help much. The
expected duration is bounded from below by 1~(af~). Obviously in the pre-
sent context only micro effects of a cut in benefits can be investigated.
On a macro level such a policy is likely to generate additional effects
both on the inflow into unemployment and on the transition from unemploy-
ment into employment (Narendranathan, Nickell ~ Stern (1985)). Also, if
there is an element of choice as to whether to become a nonparticipant or
not, then a cut in benefits may have an effect on ;. The sign of this
effect depends among other things on the dependence of the distribution of
income of nonparticipants on the level of benefits. If benefits are de-
creased whereas the incomes of nonparticipants like conscripts and dis-
abled remain unchanged then equation (2.2) does not hold anymore. There-
fore an investigation of the relation between b and ~ should be made in a
wholly structural model setting and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Inclusion of log (benefits) as a regressor in log ~ resulted in a highly
insignificant parameter estimate of -0.14 (t - 0.3), all other things
being almost identically equal.
From the results it is also clear that at an individual level
additional educational training increases labour market opportunities.
5.3. The model speciffcation revfsited
In this subsection it is examined whether the results are sensiti-
ve with respect to changes in some of the assumptions made. As for changes
in the way jobs are characterized in the model (infinite duration, con-
stant wages) we refer to section 6 in which estimation results are pre-
sented for an extended model that deals with this.
When deriving the likelihood no account has been taken of unob-
served heterogeneity in the sample. If unobserved heterogeneity is present
in reality then the estimates may be inconsistent. However, estimating a
structural model that allows for such heterogeneity is extremely compli-
cated. Consider e.g. the case in which unobserved heterogeneity is present
in a. We may rewrite a as a product24
Table 3. Probabilities and expectations
(i) by age category
age category
~ (expected number
of offers in a week)
F(p) (proportion of
offers acceptable)









(5.1) ~ - v.exp(x'g)
18-23 24-29 30-45 46-64 average
0.012 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.012
0.99 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.97
0.007 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.004
1 2 3 4 5
0.004 0.014 0.018 0.024 0.033
1.00 0.98 0.94 0.89 0.82
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
in which the random term v represents unobserved heterogeneíty in a across
the population. Substitution of equation (5.1) in equations (2.3) and
(2.1) reveals that the hazard cannot be written explicitly as an analyti-
cal function of v. Therefore, calculating the unconditional (on v) dura-
tion density by integrating the conditional density with respect to the
density of v will be very complicated. There is however a way of testing
unobserved heterogeneity which does not require specifying a more general
class of models. According to e.g. Chesher 8~ Spady (1988) White's Informa-
tion Matrix (IM) test which is generally considered to be an omnibus test
for misspecification can be interpreted as a test for unobserved heteroge-
neity across individuals in a model of the behaviour of individual agents.
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Table 4. Elasticities with respect to benefits





~ log g (hazard)
~ log b
~ lo~ d
~ log b (expected duration)








18-23 24-29 30-45 46-64 average
0.36 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.30
-0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.03
o.oi 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03
i 2 3 4 5
0.44 0.24 0.23 o.i9 O.i6
0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -o.ii
o.oo 0.03 0.05 0.07 o.io
d equals the expected duration of unemployment.
may be present we performed IM tests on the set of parameters which con-
stitutes ~, on the set which constitutes ~ and on v. Because the degrees
of freedom get very large if all elements of the IM are used for the test
Table 5. Information Matrix tests
parameters test statistic degree of freedom critical level
a 18.9 14 23.7
3 6.9 5 11.1
~ 5.8 1 3.827
wc restricted ourselves to diagonal elements of the IM. Table 5 reports
the test statistics along with the 5x critical levels of the corresponding
limiting chi-square distribution. The results show that the hypothesis of
no unobserved heterogeneity cannot be rejected for ~ and ~. The test sta-
tistic for v indicates that individuals are heterogeneous with respect to
the disutility of unemployment. According tot Chesher ~ Spady (1988) the
IM test based on the chi-square distribution generally has excessive size
even in quite large samples. However, the test result on v is plausible in
the sense that v is the only estimated exogenous variable which is not
parametrized. It thus seems natural to extend the model by making v a
function of observable individual characteristics. Also, one might ask why
p is not estimated and why u is not parametrized e.g. by assuming it to be
a one-parameter CARA utility function. Though such extensions do not raise
identification problems in the statistical sense, it appeared that there
is not sufficient information in the data to be able to estimate such
additional parameters. Apparently the likelihood is an almost completely
constant function of such parameters in the neighbourhood of the optimum.
This can be explained by recalling the results in tables 3 and 4. First
note that generally ~ is small with respect to most wage offers, which
implies that f(~) is small so small changes in p given values of a, ~ and
F(w) do not affect the value of the likelihood function much. Secondly, u,
p and v enter the likelihood only via ~. Therefore the correlation between
estimates of parameters of u, v and p will be very high.
In the empirical model v is the only parameter that enters the
likelihood via ~ only. The discussion in the previous paragraph suggests
Table 6. Alternative values of p




that v might be biased if u is misspecified or if p has the wrong value.
This is investigated by re-estimating the model with different u and p.
Table 6 presents some results for alternative values of p. The estimates
for ~ and ~ hardly differ from the original results. The differences in
the value of p are absorbed by v, higher values of p resulting in higher
values of v thus holding p and therefore the fit of the model constant.
Still, throughout the range of acceptable values of p, v is significantly
smaller than 1 according to LR tests at the lx level. Even in the limiting
case of p- m the estimate of v is significantly smaller than 1(v-0.91).
We also tried to re-estimate the model using a linear utility func-
tion u of income. This did not work. In the process of maximizing the
likelihood v tended to zero. This may be regarded as a justification for
using a risk-averse specification of u because in that case the level of y~
for v- 0 is ceteris paribus lower than the corresponding level in the
risk-neutral case.
In section 2 we stated the assumptions that equation (2.2) holds
and that the non-pecuniary utility of being a nonparticipant equals that
of being unemployed. In what sense are the results affected if these as-
sumptions are relaxed? Denote the non-pecuniary component of utility in
nonparticipation by vl and the corresponding component in unemployment by
v2. It can be shown that if vl ~ v2 or Eu(x) ~ u(b) then the parameter v
in equation (2.3) has to be replaced by
Eu x
(5.2) ~ vl u(b) } pv2
3 i P
in order to obtain the equation for the optimal rservation wage. So then v
represents the estimate of expression (5.2). It follows that
v1.Eu(x) ~ v2.u(b) c~
n
v ) v2
so if we believe that vl ~ v2 or that Eu(x) ) u(b) then the estimate of v
implies that the estimate of the disutility of unemployment is even smal-
ler than 0.74. Note that in the more general model in which it is allowed
that vl ~ v2 or Eu(x) ~ u(b), the IM test result on v can be interpreted
as evidence that individuals are heterogeneous with respect to expression29
(5.2). This result is not surprising because individuals differ with res-
pect to the values of b and ~.
In section 3 we discussed the so-called memory problems. There it
was argued that values of 3 and 9 months for T1 and tl respectively, were
plausible. It appears that the parameter estimates are insensitive to
changes of these values, though standard errors increase if T1 increases
or tl decreases.
When deriving the distribution of the backward recurrence time t we
assumed that the rate of entry into unemployment is constant until May
1984. One may question whether this assumption holds true. According to
Pissarides (1986) in the U.K. the entry rate was fairly constant between
196~ and 1983 apart from an increase in 19~9-1981. In the absence of re-
liable Dutch data we examine the sensitivy of the results with respect to
the constant entry rate assumption by re-estimating the model with a time-
varying entry rate. In particular we take as an alternative assumption
that the entry rate q between January 198o and January 1983 is twice as
large as it is outside that time interval. In appendix 2 the appropriate
likelihood is derived. The main effect of the alternative assumption on q
on the estimation results is that the exit rate out of unemployment 8 t~
is estimated to be 13x larger. However, 9 and ~ are still very small, and
v, F(~) and the elasticities are insensitive to the change in the as-
sumption on q. Thus, the main results and conclusions from subsections 5.1
and 5.2 do not appear to be sensitive to a priori reasonable changes in
the assumptions about the time pattern of the entry rate into unemploy-
ment.
One may question whether the estimation results are affected by a
possible misspecification of the wage offer distribution which is estima-
ted a priori. Obviously, F(w) plays a central role in the model because
the trade-off between wages and benefits is a major determinant of search
behaviour. We constructed F(w) which are lognormal and have same variances
as before, but which have expectations that are shifted by 20x in compari-
son to the expectations derived in section 4. Re-estimation of the model
using these alternative F(w) resulted ín values that are almost identical
to those presented in tables 2-4. The shifts in E(w) are absorbed by v, a
value of 1.2 times the original E(w) resulting in v--0.20 and a value of
0.8 times the original E(w) resulting in v--0.45. Consequently, the main30
conclusions are insensitive with respect to small misspecifications in the
location of F(w).
6. An extended model
6.1. The model
In reality the duration of employment is not infinite, nor are
wages constant during employment. The prospective rate of wage increases
and the distribution of the duration of employment affect the value of
search of an unemployed individual. Therefore they should be incorporated
in the model. In this section we deal with this.
We assume that the duration of employment has an exponential dis-
tribution with parameter s which is the layoff rate. During one period of
employment one can hold several consecutive jobs without intervening
spells of unemployment. It is assumed that one returns to the state of
unemployment if a layoff occurs, and that the duration of employment is
stochastically independent of both the initial wage rate and the duration
of unemployment that preceeds employment.
During a spell of employment wages can increase for several reasons
such as rising productivity or transitions from jobs with lower wages to
jobs with higher wager without intervening spells of unemployment (on-the-
job search). As a stylized description of this we assume that the wage
pattern during employment is characterized by w(t) giving the wage rate as
a function of the time t that one is employed conditional on the initial
wage w(0).
(6.1) w(t) - w(o).eat
in which a does not depend on w(o) or t or on the duration of unemployment
preceeding employment. Through it is conceivable that mechanisms linking
a, t and w(o) exist, the exploration of this is beyond the scope of the
paper.
The extensions of the model do not affect the stationarity property
of search behaviour of the unemployed. In appendix 3 it is proven that the
reservation wage ~ corresponding to the optimal strategy satisfies31
(6.2) log ~- v.log b} P~~.P} . f(log w- log ~)dF(w) - Pas
~
F(w) is the distribution of initial-wage offers, which is the distribution
from which the w(0) are drawn. Note that the derivative of ~ with respect
to a is negative. If a is large then the value of search is high. However,
this does not make the searcher more selective with regards to wage of-
fers. It is profitable to give up more present income (a low w(0)) in
order to obtain a higher income in the future.
The estimation of F(w) has to be reconsidered because in section 4
we used a(cross section) sample from the stock of the employed and there-
fore used data on current wages, that is, data on wages which are higher
than the initial wages offered at the start of the current employment
spell. We assume that the distribution of current wages is lognormal with
parameters u and o2. Thus, table 1 gives estimates of these parameters.
The distribution F(w) of initial-wage offers has to be recovered from the
distribution of curre~it wages. In appendix 4 it is shown that F(w) can be
approximated by a lognormal distribution with parameters (u } log(s-a) -
log s) and o2,
(6.3) F(w) a LN(u } log ssa, 62)
This requires s) a. The approximation is good for s)~ a.
6.2. The resu7.ts
The approximation in equation (6.3) is used to obtain a priori
estimates of the individual distribution functions F(w). The results in
table 1 provide the individual values of H and o2. The parameter a is
fixed at 4x per year. We used the elapsed duration of employment of indi-
viduals who were employed in April 1984 to estimate s. Since we assume
that the entry rate into employment is constant (the stationarity assump-
tion) these incomplete durations have an exponential distribution with
parameter s. In accordance with the treatment of the memory problem in
subsection 3.2 durations are censored at 9 months. The ML estimate of s
equals 14.4x per year (t-ratio equals 14.2) which implies that the ex-
pected duration of employment is almost seven years. This estimate may be32
biased for a variety of reasons (e.g. because of neglected unobserved
heterogeinity) but we believe that for our purposes it is accurate enough.
From equation (6.3) it can be deduced that the expectation and the
standard deviation of F(w) are 100.(a~s)z - 28x smaller than those ob-
tained in section 4. The sample average of the probability that a random
initial-wage offer exceeds the benefit level is 0.61 as opposed to 0.91 in
case F(w) is estimated like in section 4.
Table 7. Estimates for the extended search model





~ log ~~~ log b o.49 0.30
~ 1og 8~~ log b -0.04 -0.03
~ log d~~ log b 0.03 0.03
Table 8. Alternative values of p and a
rho (per year) alpha (per year) log-likelihood value v
1oz 3X -898.50 0.84
lOX 4x -898.50 0.83
1oZ 5x -898.49 0.82
5X 4x -898.58 0.85
15X 4x -898.50 0.8333
'Tlie estimates and t-ratios of the parameters of a and ; differ
hardly from those presented in table 2. Further, the general pattern of
the results presented in tables 3 and 4 is preserved. Therefore only sam-
ple averages of the main variables are presented for the extended model
(see table 7). F(p), a and ~ have almost the same sample averages as befo-
re. The parameter v is significantly smaller than 1 according to a LR test
2
(test-statistic value 36.0 )~ xl(0.99)). The job offer acceptance probabi-
lity is large because of the combination of a small job offer arrival rate
and a low utility value attached to being in the state of unemployment.
The latter holds both because one dislikes being unemployed for non-pecu-
niary reasons and because in unemployment income is constant whereas one
expects it to increase in employment. In the extended model b is generally
close to the median of F(w). So in this model it is the rate of income
increases rather than the level of income which makes employment prefer-
able from a material point of view. The elasticity of the expected dura-
tion with respect to the level of benefits is very small. This is basical-
ly a consequence of the large value of F(~).
From table 8 we infer that the results are insensitive to changing
the assumptions on the values of p and a. The fit of the model is almost
n
constant for the cases considered. Note that the sensitivity of v to chan-
ges in the value of p is less than in the basic model.
In sum, the main conclusions from section 5 about the parameter
estimates, about the relative magnitudes of the main variables for diffe-
rent age categories and levels of education, and about the effects of
changes in the level of benefits, remain unaffected. The results in this
section suggest that on-the-job search may be an important factor for
search behaviour of the unemployed. Therefore a topic for further research
would be to extend the model to include on-the-job search explicitly.
Using data of ewployed and unemployed individuals simultaneously, the wage
offer distribution could be estimated along with the other variables.
Also, some of the rather rigid assumptions that were made in this section
could be relaxed in such a model.34
~. Conclusions
In this paper we have extended the existing empirical literature on
structural job search models by specifying and estimating a model that
allows for transitions from unemployment into nonparticipation. Moreover,
a version of the model deals with the influence of prospective wage in-
creases during employment on the search behaviour of the unemployed. The
model is estimated using Dutch data from 1983-1985. The results indicate
that almost every job offer is scceptable. The reason for this is the
combination of a very small job offer arrival rate and low values of the
utility function in unemployment relative to employment. If one turns down
an offer then generally one has to wait for a very long time before the
next offer arrives. In the meantime one is unemployed, which is disliked
both for pecuniary and for non-pecuniary reasons. As for the pecuniary
reasons, in the basic model these refer to the low level of benefits rela-
tive to wages. If account is taken of wage increases during employment
then generally the estimated difference between benefits and initial-wage
offers is much smaller. However, the prospect of wage increases causes the
unemployed searcher to set a low reservation wage as well. The results
imply that at an individual level a decrease in benefits is ineffective in
reducing unemployment duration. The estimation results appear to be robust
to varying certain assumptions.35
Appendix 1
Derivation of equation (2.3)
Basically, the derivation proceeds along the lines of Lancaster 8~
Chesher (1983)'s derivation of the reservation wage equation in a standard
model with income maximization and ;- 0. First, consider a moment t at
which an offer is pending. Let Ie denote the value at time t of following
the optimal strategy. An acceptance policy can be characterized by a func-
tion p mapping [O,m~ onto [0,1] and giving for every w the probability
that a wage offer w will be accepted. R is defined to be the return of
rejecting the offer and behaving optimally afterwards. Because of the
stationarity assumption Ie, p and R do not depend on t. Thus, at every
moment at which an offer is pending, Ie denotes the present value of fol-
lowing the optimal strategy.
(A1.1) Ie - sup f~lp(w) upw t( 1-p(w)).RJdF(w)
p 0 L
r
It follows that the optimal acceptance policy p is given by
~




so p can be characterized by a reservation wage p, satisfying
(A1.3) u(P) - p.R
Thus (A1.1) can be written as
(A1.4) Ie - R t P. fm(u(w)-u(V))dFÍw)
~
Let I denote the expected return at a moment at which a transi-
n
tion into nonparticipation occurs. From the assumptions about expected
utility during nonpartícipation it follows that3b
(A1.5) In - f f e-pt.v.u(x)dt dH(x) - v.P b
0 0
in which H(x) is the c.d.f. of income flows of nonparticipants. Let k(i)
denote the p.d.f. of the distribution of the waiting time at t until the
next event (job offer or transition into nonpartícipation) occurs. Because
of the stationarity assumption k(T), does not depend on t and is distri-
buted exponentially with parameter a t~. If an event occurs, the probabi-
lity that this event is a job offer is equal to ~~(~t~). Now R can be
written as
(A1.6) R- ó~k(T) Of~v.u(b)e-psds t e-pTi~};.Ie t~.InfldY
which reduces to
v.u(b)taIet~In
(A1.~) R - p}~}~
Substitution of (A1.3), (A1.4) and (A1.5) in (A1.~) gives the desired
result. Note that for equation (2.3) to hold it is not necessary that the
distribution of income flows of nonparticipants and the per-period utility
function of nonparticipants, are independent of the time spent in the
state of nonparticipation. What is essential is that the expected discoun-
ted lifetime utility at the moment that one becomes a nonparticipant In
equals v.u(b)~p. Therefore equation (A1.5) can be replaced by
(A1.8) In - f e-pt f v(t)u(x;t)dH(x~t)dt - v.u b
0 0 p
in which t denotes the duration in the state of nonparticipation; the
definitions of v(t), u(x;t) and H(x~t) are obvious.
The model can also be extended in another direction without chan-
ging the outcomes. From the examples of transitions from unemployment into
nonparticipation it is clear that one can also expect transitions from
employment into nonparticipation to be present in reality. If so then the
unemployed individual is assumed to take account of this when determining37
his optimal strategy. Let transitions from employment into nonparticipa-
tion arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival rate w. We assume
that the expected discounted lifetime utility at the moment that one beco-
mes a nonparticipant is independent of the origin state and is denoted by




(A1.9) u(~) - P~~ (P.InÍT-w)tv.u(b).(Ptw)) t P~~. f(u(w)-u(~))dF(w)
~
If we impose that w-;, that is, if we assume that the transition rate
into nonparticipation is the same for employed and unemployed individuals
then equation (A1.9) reduces to equation (2.3). This result holds regard-
less of the value of In as long as it is fixed. For our purposes it is
even more interesting that if equation (A1.8) is substituted in equation
(A1.9) this equation again reduces to equation (2.3). That is, the reser-
vation wage does not depend on w if (A1.8) holds.
Appendix 2
Likelihood function in case of a time-varying entry rate.
If the entry rate into unemployment is dependent on time then the
backward recurrence time t no longer has an exponential distribution.
Consequently the likelihood contribution L2 (see equation (3.4)) has to be
modified. From Ridder (1984), the density function h(t~x) of t given time-
independent personal characteristics x is given by
(A2.1) h(t~x) -




in which w ~ w(x) ~ 6(x) t~(x) and in which q(-t~x) is the entry rate at





t2 s t ( t3
with t2 and t3 equal to 16 and 52 months, respectively. The variable t is
censored at tl (see subsection 3.2). By substituting (A2.2) in (A2.1),
taking account of the censoring, and by taking the logarithm, the modified
L2 is obtained. This expression does not depend on q(O~x).
Appendix 3
Proof of equation (6.2)
The line of argument and the notation of appendix 1 are followed.
Equations (A1.~) and (A1.8) remain valid.
Equation (A1.1) is replaced by
m t 1
(A3.1) le - suP f[P(w)- Et f e-P~u(e~.w)dwfe-pt.R t(1-P(w)).RJdF(w)
p 0 0
The expectation Et is taken w.r.t. the duration of employment. The reser-
vation wage p characterizes the optimal strategy,
t
(A3.2) Et f e-P~.u(eaw.P)d~ - Et(1-e-Pt).R
0
Substitution in (A3.1) gives, noting that u is the logarithmic function,
m
(A3.3) le - R t P Et(1-e-Pt). f( log w-log q~)dF(w)
~
Equation (A3.2) can be simplified to
t 1 ( 1
(A3.4) Et( f awe-P~dcrl - Et(1-e-pt).IR - 1~~J l~ JJJ l P39








(A3.5) log S~ - P.R - Pas
(A3.6) Ie - R a P}s- f(log w-log ~)dF(w)
~
Substitution of (A3.5), (A3.6) and (A1.8) in (A1.7) gives the desired
result.
Appendix 4
Approximation of the distribution of initial-wage offers.
In order to avoid confusion between initial wages and current
wages the latter is denoted by y and the former by w. The distribution
over the population of completed durations of employment ís exponential
with parameter s. We observe a(cross-section) sample from the stock of
the employed, which means that the durations of employment t are incomple-
te. However the entry rate into employment is time-independent due to the
stationarity assumption. Therefore such incomplete durations have an expo-
nentíal distribution with parameter s as well.
An observed (current) wage y is the product of two unobserved
stochastic terms
(A4.1) y - eat w
in which t denotes the incomplete duration of employment. Since t and w
are independent the moments of y are easily expressed in terms of the
moments of w,40
(A4.2) E(Y) - E(eat).E(w) - ssa.E(w)
(A4.3) var(Y) - (ssa)2.var(w) { ( sa~)2'sg2a E(w2)
Define ~-~~s. Equations (A4.2) and (A4.3) can be rewritten as
(A4.4) E(w) - (1-~).E(y)
(A4.5) var(w) - (1-~)2.var(y) f 0(~2)
Consequently, if we use
(A4.6) w - (i-~).y
in order to recover F(w) from the distribution of y then the first moment
of the distribution thus obtained is correct while the second central
moment is correct up to the second order of a~s. For a small as compared
to s the distribution of w based on equation (A4.6) is a good approxima-
tion of the true F(w) though the variance of F(w) is somewhat overstated.
It is assumed that y~ LN(u,o2) so
(A4.7) (1-~).y ~ LN(H,1oB(1-~).62)
Therefore F(w) is approximated according to equations (A4.6) snd (A4.7).
From equation (A4.1) and from the assumptions on the parametric forms of
the distributions of y and t the true F(w) can be deduced. However this
gives rather problematic results for the parametric forms that were
chosen. Rather than modifying these choices we prefer to approximate F(w)
as set out in the previous paragraph.41
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